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Assessing the Thin Regulation 




This article addresses the data protection and prod-
uct safety regulatory models currently applied to con-
sumer-facing health technologies. These are technolo-
gies that increasingly support citizen science or other 
research not currently regulated by the NIH/Com-
mon Rule/IRB triad. They also may facilitate corpo-
rate “research,” the generation or aggregation of health 
or wellness data that data-driven companies seek to 
leverage to drive advertising or broader data-broker 
businesses. Regulatory questions arise because these 
technologies impact a broad array of ethical, legal, and 
social issues, in particular challenging our notions of 
safety, quality, efficacy, and data protection. 
The article explains how the design and structures 
of existing data protection and safety regulation in the 
U.S. have resulted in exceptionally thin protection for 
the users of consumer-facing devices and products 
that rely on or that facilitate consumer collection or 
aggregation of health and wellness data. It also exam-
ines some appealing legislative alternatives to the cur-
rent thin model used in the U.S. and suggests a frame-
work for prioritizing ameliorative regulation.
II. Scoping
The variety of technologies, platforms, apps, and 
Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) business models and the 
emerging use of these for unregulated or underregu-
lated research pose an initial scoping question. It is 
insufficient to merely point to unregulated conduct or 
an unregulated space. What, therefore, are the nar-
rowing criteria? Are all technologies included or only 
“devices”? Do the issues arise within the traditional 
healthcare system or only outside it in “disruption” 
space?
The answer seems to be twofold. First, the tech-
nologies of concern are consumer-facing. Second, 
they rotate in some way around consumer-generated 
or -aggregated data. As to the first, the technologies 
include not only mobile platforms and their native 
apps but also web apps, social media platforms, and 
their apps. Because of the likely technological media-
tion and data models, the products of interest extend 
to DTC diagnostic or genetic data devices.
Because data are non-rival, they can exist in more 
than one place. For example, clinical data held by 
a health care professional generally would not be 
viewed as consumer data. However, that same data, 
once accessed by the data subject through an app or 
device, would be included as patient-curated. Simi-
larly, health, wellness, or research data generated by 
a patient’s mobile platform or by a wearable device 
would be included. 
III. Analytical Model
This brief article limits its analyses to the two regula-
tory systems of greatest importance regarding current 
consumer-facing health technologies: data protection 
and safety.1 To better understand existing regulatory 
models, their deficiencies, and how they should be 
reformed, it is helpful to explain these regulatory sys-
tems across two axes. The vertical axis describes the 
quantity or depth of regulation, such as, for example, 
the strictness of the rules imposed by the regulatory 
model. The horizontal axis describes the reach of the 
regulation, the behaviors, products, or industries to 
which the regulation applies.
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First, take data protection (Figure 1). Rather than 
all industries being covered by a single data protection 
regime (as is the case with the European General Data 
Protection Regulation, or GDPR2), in the U.S., dif-
ferent sectors have their own rules. For example, the 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) governs consumer 
privacy in the financial sector3 while the HIPAA Pri-
vacy, Breach Notification, and Security rules govern 
patient privacy in most traditional health care settings. 
However, these rules apply only to HIPAA-covered 
entities or their “business associates.”4 In contrast, the 
HIPAA rules seldom will apply to consumer-facing 
health technologies enabling patient-generated or-
curated data as they will be provided by mobile plat-
form manufacturers or sourced from online app stores.
Absent specific sectoral data protection, indus-
tries such as those that supply consumer-facing web 
or device apps, are not subject to any robust form of 
federal data protection. While the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) has overarching jurisdiction, even over-
lapping with HIPAA in some health care cases,5 its 
prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce”6 are thin and limit agency 
actions to parsing privacy policies or other representa-
tions by sellers7 or, occasionally, pushing back against 
repeat offenders.8
Even where the HIPAA rules do apply, they are 
somewhat limited on the vertical axis. Those rules 
only regulate downstream, post-collection interac-
tions with patient data such as unauthorized disclo-
sure (The Privacy Rule), not upstream, collection-
limiting interactions such as the data minimization 
or purpose limitations required by the GDPR9 or the 
somewhat exceptional U.S. prohibitions on the collec-
tion of genetic data provided for in the Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.10
Similar limitations play out regarding the safety of 
consumer-facing web or device apps (Figure 2). Most 
health-related drugs and devices will be regulated 
by the FDA. However, the overwhelming majority of 
consumer-facing products will be regulated separately 
by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC)11 while some FDA or non-FDA devices may be 
subject to other (and narrow, domain-specific) regu-
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latory requirements such as the Federal Communica-
tions Commission’s rules on devices emitting radio 
frequencies.12 On the vertical axis of product safety, 
and stated in broad terms, FDA drug regulation is 
arguably the strongest (and stronger than its regu-
lation of devices or food). The CPSC has a relatively 
shallow safety jurisdiction; although it does exercise 
regulatory powers to ban some products or their com-
ponents,13 most of its jurisdiction is reactive, banning 
or recalling products proven to be dangerous.14 In this 
regard, the CPSC’s role in product safety somewhat 
resembles the FTC’s role in the data protection space. 
Overall, although somewhat fragmented, the regu-
lation of products is less susceptible to regulatory arbi-
trage15 than current U.S. data protection laws. This is 
because the regulatory touchstone is a product type 
(for example, a device or a drug) rather than a type of 
data custodian (for example, a HIPAA-covered entity).
The regulatory touchstone for the regulation of 
health-related product safety is a subset of product: 
“device” as defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.16 On the horizontal axis, albeit already 
one limited to the medical domain, “device” has had 
an expansive meaning within that domain. It applies 
to software (software as medical device or SaMD) as 
well as hardware17 and is not limited by market, apply-
ing equally to products distributed directly to con-
sumers and through health care providers.18
Recently, however, that conception of medical 
device has begun to shrink. This may be a function 
of the FDA and Congress believing that large swathes 
of consumer-facing devices are very low risk or that 
overregulation was stifling innovation.19 Whatever 
the reason, the FDA first started to shrink the prod-
ucts it would regulate by issuing sub-regulatory guid-
ances noting that it would exercise regulatory dis-
cretion with regard to certain types of products.20 In 
2016 Congress went further in the 21st Century Cures 
Act (Cures), excluding “a software function that is 
intended … for maintaining or encouraging a healthy 
lifestyle and is unrelated to the diagnosis, cure, miti-
gation, prevention, or treatment of a disease or condi-
tion”21 (Figure 3)..
The FDA’s Digital Health Innovation Action Plan22 
likely will result in still more consumer-facing devices 
being removed from direct regulatory scrutiny. The 
Action Plan’s centerpiece is the agency’s Precertifica-
tion (Pre-Cert) Program that certifies manufactur-
ers and their safety-testing protocols that evidence 
“excellence.”23 The internal processes of these certified 
manufacturers are then used as a surrogate for tradi-
tional agency review.24 Manufacturers who have been 
certified in the Pre-Cert pilot program include sev-
eral manufacturers of consumer-facing platforms and 
apps such as Apple, Fitbit, and Samsung. The devices 
that are no longer subject to traditional FDA processes 
either, as is the case with Pre-cert products, will attract 
reduced regulation (for example, post-marketing 
surveillance only) or with “devices” exempted by the 
Cures Act, henceforth will be subject to the reduced 
protection offered by the CPSC or ex-post state prod-
ucts liability law.25
Device regulation is also limited on the vertical axis. 
Historically, the FDA has approved devices that are 
reasonably safe and “effective for a particular use”26 or 
efficacy. These are relatively limited criteria given that, 
increasingly, consumer-facing health and wellness 
devices are viewed as substitutes for aspects of clinical 
care, such as preventative care, physical surveillance, 
and chronic disease management. Contemplation of 
Figure 2
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such substitutions suggests that consumers would 
benefit from information not only about a device’s 
safety and efficacy but also its comparative effective-
ness or cost effectiveness with regard to other devices 
or treatments.27 The FDA also is noticeably reticent 
about reviewing devices for data protection risks. The 
FDA has partially recognized these and has issued 
sub-regulatory guidances to device manufacturers 
about security risks,28 and advanced device cybersecu-
rity is one of the pillars of the agency’s Medical Device 
Safety Action Plan.29
There have been a small number of attempts to 
patch, or at least better explain or clarify, the frag-
mented nature of both regulations and regulators. 
Sub-regulatory guidances issued by the FDA are 
examples. Further, in 2016 the Office of the National 
Coordinator, the FTC, and the FDA jointly issued an 
interactive tool to advise health app developers to the 
potential applicability of HIPAA, the FDA’s device reg-
ulation, the FTC’s jurisdiction over deceptive or unfair 
acts, and the FTC’s Breach Notification Rule for per-
sonal health records.30
Overall, however, the data protection and safety reg-
ulatory models applicable to health or health research 
consumer-facing technologies exhibit critical levels of 
underregulation and considerable fragmentation at 
both the regulation and regulator levels. Their under-
regulation is most obvious on the vertical axis, with 
U.S. models applying quite low levels of protection for 
consumers, particularly given the sensitive nature of 
health and wellness information and the potential for 
surveillance and discriminatory misuse. 
Fragmentation is most obvious on the horizontal 
axis, engendering consumer confusion as to what reg-
ulation or which regulator applies to a technology or, 
worse, encouraging businesses to exploit differential 
regulatory models through arbitrage. The most obvi-
ous example of the latter is the ability of data brokers 
to essentially recreate clinical records (that, in identi-
fied form, are protected by HIPAA) outside HIPAA-
regulated space with social media and other types of 
medically inflected data.31
A broader question about regulatory fragmentation 
also is emerging: are questions about data protection 
and safety sufficiently separate (witness the concerns 
over the security of medical devices32) to justify dis-
crete regulatory systems or — and this seems to be 
even more crucial at the data-product intersection — 
would a more holistic model be preferable? This is a 
question that appears particularly critical as data and 
device merge such as in products that make extensive 
use of artificial intelligence.33
IV. Legislative Models
The obvious but politically unlikely model for reform-
ing the regulatory models applicable to consumer-
facing technologies is twofold. First, the regulatory 
frameworks should be far more inclusive as to the 
producers or products they pertain to (the horizontal 
axis). Second, they should be more robust in their sub-
stantive regulation (the vertical axis).
The GDPR data protection framework is most 
typically favored by pro-privacy reformers seeking to 
improve the data protection applicable to consumer-
facing health technologies in the U.S. In broad terms, 
the GDPR increases data protection and minimizes 
regulatory arbitrage by using broad inclusive language 
such as “personal data,” “data subject,” and “process-
ing” to define the regulation’s horizontal scope.34 On 
the vertical axis, it sets out clear principles by which to 
Figure 3
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limit data collection and processing, such as transpar-
ency, a purpose limitation, and data minimization.35 
In the United States, the closest analogue to the 
GDPR is California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 
effective in January 2020.36 That statute promotes 
(initially at least) broad applicability on the horizontal 
axis by establishing “consumer” rights and “business” 
duties (rather than protecting only narrow domains) 
and expressly including biometric and health insur-
ance information.37 On the vertical axis, the statute 
primarily relies on a transparency model requiring 
data custodians to disclose what information they 
hold about a data subject and whether it is being sold 
or otherwise disclosed. The data subject can stop the 
sale of the information and cannot be discriminated 
against in service or if they exercise their rights.38 
However, domain carveouts for HIPAA entities and 
human subjects research data39 derogate somewhat 
from what at first sight seemed domain agnosticism. 
As a result, the statute perpetuates some data protec-
tion fragmentation on the horizontal axis. Notwith-
standing, even with that flaw, the statute dramatically 
increases the protection of data collected or generated 
by consumer-facing health technologies as evidenced 
by the attempts of Google and other consumer-fac-
ing technology companies to weaken the legislation 
before it can take effect.40 Not surprisingly, the Cali-
fornia statute has been viewed as a possible model for 
enactment by other states.41 The California statute 
also seems to have engendered corporate support for 
increased federal data protection.42 However, once 
scrutinized, those interests actually favor a series of 
lesser protections that, crucially, would be accompa-
nied by a provision preempting the California statute 
and any state laws that may mimic it.43
There is legislative interest in extending data protec-
tion. It finds expression either in general statutes such 
as California’s or enactments that protect, for example, 
narrower slices of data such as biometric data.44 How-
ever, the same cannot be said of device safety. Indeed, 
all indications are that the FDA remains committed to 
its existing model and its Pre-cert carve-out, notwith-
standing questions that have been raised as to both its 
functioning and its statutory basis.45 For example, the 
FDA has not only released an upgraded framework for 
Pre-cert but also indicated that it may adopt a similar 
structure for other challenging SaMD products such 
as “unlocked” AI/ML algorithms.46
V. Policy Frameworks
In the absence of broad protections that feature 
domain agnostic applicability (horizontal axis) and 
robust, multi-factor protections (vertical axis), policy-
makers need to concentrate on more specific problems 
and solutions. One way to prioritize and calibrate reg-
ulatory and non-regulatory interventions is through 
examining the extent to which market or similar rela-
tionships can achieve at least basic protections.
Thus, regulatory priority should be given to situa-
tions where there is no direct or market relationship 
between the consumer and the data custodian such 
that questions of consent to collection or processing 
could be negotiated (Figure 4). This is most clearly 
exemplified by the data-broker industry that is col-
lecting both deidentified clinical data and identified 
or identifiable consumer-generated health or research 
data.47 Other than the specific authority enjoyed by the 
FTC under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to regulate 
some data brokers who are also consumer reporting 
agencies,48 the only meaningful data-broker legisla-
tion is Vermont’s: a 2018 statute requires data brokers 
Figure 4
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to register with the state (over 120 have so far49) and 
to note whether they permit consumers to opt-out of 
data collection.50
Consumers have no relationship with such data 
custodians and, in all likelihood and unless they live 
in Vermont, do not know their identity, whether they 
have data relating to them, or how they can be con-
tacted. Notwithstanding the many earnest govern-
ment reports noting the problems associated with an 
unrestrained data broker industry, there has been no 
meaningful federal response.51 
At the other extreme, of course, there will be situ-
ations where there is a direct (and likely market) 
relationship between the consumer and the data cus-
todian or device/service distributor. In such cases, a 
rational expectation would be that, for example, con-
sumers will be attracted to platforms that espouse 
greater privacy and security or at least make rational 
tradeoffs between data protection and other features. 
This is certainly the bet that Apple is making to dif-
ferentiate their products and services from other tech-
nology companies interested in the health space such 
as Facebook and Google.52 For example, Apple has 
introduced an email relay that lets users receive email 
from third parties while keeping their actual email 
addresses private.53 Similarly, Apple Pay and Apple 
Card enable privacy and security seldom seen in the 
financial services space.54 
The consumer-facing health app space provides 
an opportunity for developers to differentiate them-
selves on the basis of data protection. However, few 
do. Fertility or menstrual cycle tracking apps are a 
good example with the leading apps selling deiden-
tified, aggregated data not only to researchers and 
marketing companies but also employers and health 
insurers.55 In contrast, “Euki,” an app developed by the 
Women Help Women non-profit organization keeps 
all the data the user generates on-device not in the 
cloud such that only the user and neither the platform 
owner nor the developer has access.56
Of course, some consumers (perhaps underedu-
cated as to the seriousness of the tradeoff) may place 
a high value on “free” services that are provided in 
exchange for personal information. At the extreme, 
this conjures up the dystopian idea of “surveillance 
capitalism” whereby businesses provide free access 
to social interactions, search, or even healthcare in 
exchange for untold amounts of consumer, including 
health, data. 57 The dominant data protection model 
in the direct relationship scenarios remains bankrupt 
notice and consent, which provides at best illusory 
“protection.”58 Although some more privacy-protec-
tive companies have begun to use opt-in59 rather than 
the usual opt-out version, overall, even where there is 
some direct relationship, some additional data regu-
lation will still be required to correct market failure. 
The regulatory priority in such cases should be to 
consign notice and comment to history and impose a 
California-like “right to request that a business delete 
any personal information about the consumer which 
the business has collected from the consumer.”60 Addi-
tionally, some data minimization based on a purpose 
limitation should be considered.
In between these two extremes (market/no market 
relationship) are situations where the relationship 
between consumer data subject and business data 
custodian is mediated in some way by a powerful or 
responsible infomediary or intermediary, enabling 
private ordering or soft law. As to the former a recent 
example is Google’s decision to stop taking ads for 
“unproven or experimental medical techniques,” spe-
cifically targeting ads for stem cell therapy.61
Platform owners are also market-aligned regulators, 
particularly powerful intermediaries capable of impos-
ing technical barriers to curtail abusive behaviors of 
businesses using their platforms. For example, both 
Google and Apple have introduced software on their 
platforms to intercept robocalls made to consumers.62
Additionally, some market-dominating platforms 
require that all apps must be distributed from app 
stores controlled by the platform owners. Thus, Apple’s 
Regulatory priority should be given to situations where there is  
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custodian such that questions of consent to collection or processing could  
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App Store rules prohibit developers from using “data 
gathered in the health, fitness, and medical research 
context ... for advertising or other use‐based data min-
ing purposes other than improving health manage-
ment.” The Apple App Store also requires that develop-
ers of apps that use the HealthKit framework publish 
privacy policies and imposes additional restrictions on 
developers whose apps use HealthKit to support clini-
cal research.63 The credibility of such intermediaries in 
protecting consumers data and safety can be increased 
when the businesses have strong internal ethics boards 
or similar machinery, although the opposite is also true 
and credibility is lessened when such boards fail.64
In the healthcare space, IRBs have long been the 
quintessential intermediaries, protecting research 
subjects from overreaching by researchers and some 
consumer-facing technologies leverage IRBs by 
requiring their participation in technologically-medi-
ated research.65 However, the majority of the citizen 
research considered herein will take place without 
IRB approval or the participation of other professional 
intermediaries by approaching consumers directly, as 
in the case of DTC genetic testing.
Traditionally physicians have played an important 
role in mitigating the risks suffered by patients. Not 
only do they owe duties of confidentiality regardless 
of the HIPAA rules and are required intermediaries 
in the distribution of prescription devices, but they 
are also important infomediaries with regard to over-
the-counter drugs, devices, and increasingly apps. 
As such, there are some opportunities for healthcare 
providers to reassert their role by curating or recom-
mending certain consumer-facing technologies that 
intrinsically or legally do not cast providers as learned 
intermediaries. However, the incentives are not well 
aligned here because healthcare professionals or insti-
tutions could face some legal jeopardy if they recom-
mend or curate consumer-facing technologies that 
implicate consumer privacy or safety.66
VI. Conclusion
The rate of iteration among companies developing 
consumer-facing healthcare technologies generat-
ing massive amounts of data continues to be rapid. 
For example, Apple recently announced the use of its 
platform and wearable technologies in novel hearing, 
women’s health, and heart and movement studies in 
partnership with major research institutions such as 
NIH’s National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and the 
University of Michigan.67 Equally, DTC genetic test-
ing has exploded with more than 12 million persons 
participating and driving an increasingly popular per-
sonal genealogy industry.68
However, regulation has not kept up. Worse, under-
regulation attracts businesses with dubious ethics 
while the regulatory uncertainty tends to keep respon-
sible businesses on the sidelines. Notwithstanding the 
absence of the political will to advance major legisla-
tion, there are plenty of opportunities for patchwork 
fixes, and these can be prioritized by understanding 
both the regulatory models as defined on both their 
vertical and horizontal axes and the relationship (or 
lack thereof ) between consumers and businesses, 
together with the hope that new intermediaries and 
infomediaries will emerge to improve the data protec-
tion and safety environments.
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